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Which Came First, The Irrational
Consumer or The Irrational
Corporation?
Angelo DeNisi* & Raed Elaydi**
It is the mission of the twentieth century to elucidate the
irrational. 1
INTRODUCTION
Most people are aware of the fact that, in recent years, there
have been a number of exceedingly large settlements that have
been imposed in product-liability cases. 2 Although many such
cases involve serious harm to the injured parties, as well as evi-
dence of foreknowledge of the potential for that harm, many other
cases do not entail harm or egregious actions. Yet, juries have
been willing to make huge awards in cases where the nature of the
problem, and/or the nature of the damages, simply do not seem to
be that serious. Although many of these judgments have been
overturned on subsequent appeal, 3 the publicity surrounding some
of these awards has led many individuals, on all sides of the issue,
to ask what can be done?
One group of individuals, primarily in the legal arena, has at-
tempted to use economic theory to limit large settlements. They
suggest that the court should adopt an economically rational ap-
proach to dealing with these cases. This group, which has been
* Professor, Department of Management, Lowry Mays College and Gradu-
ate School of Business Texas A&M University.
** Ph.D. student in Management, Graduate School of Business Texas A&M
University.
1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty et al., Texts and Dialogues (1992).
2. See Ted Evanoff, Jury Hits GM with Record Judgment; $4.9 Billion
Awarded; Lawyers Say Automakers Knew of Gas Tank Problem but Didn't Fix It,
Indianapolis Star, July 10, 1999, at Al.
3. See id.
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labeled the "law and economics movement," suggests that compa-
nies should not be held liable because consumer decisions are
based on price, and the level of risk the product possesses is em-
bedded in the price. 4 The law and economics movement assumes
that consumers act rationally (in an economic sense), and so are
willing to accept a certain amount of risk in return for lower
prices.5 If consumers wanted to avoid ALL risk, they would simply
be willing to pay more for a product.6 Thus, consumers would
largely be held responsible for their own actions, and the potential
liability for the company would be greatly reduced.
Advocates of this approach make two assumptions regarding
the consumer. First, it is assumed that consumers make rational
decisions in their purchases. 7 Consumers do not purchase items
out of impulse or depending on their mood or affective state-this
movement does not distinguish a consumer going to a grocery store
famished or full. Secondly, these advocates assume that people are
well-informed of the products that they are purchasing, giving the
consumer an ability to make rational decisions.8 Therefore, when
consumers pay less, they know they are paying less for riskier
products because the product is inherently more dangerous than
other competing products, which cost more. For example, some
consumers might be willing to pay more for a safer automobile
such as a Volvo, but not all consumers will be willing to pay this
premium. Others are either unable or unwilling to pay a premium
and so knowingly take on the risk of purchasing a Yugo. There-
fore, the law and economics theory states that the negative price of
risk is embedded in the cost of the product. The consumer in the
law and economics approach knows and understands the benefits
of owning a risky car, but realizes that these risks are worth taking
in exchange for a lower price.9 The consumer, in this view, also
believes that driving an unsafe car is better than other alterna-
4. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) (challenging classical law and economics'
views of the consumer); Mark Tushnet, Idols of the Right: The "Law and Econom-
ics" Movement, Dissent, 1993, at 475 (discussing the growth of the law and eco-
nomics movement and its effects on the legal community).
5. See Jolls et al., supra note 4, at 1541-45.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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tives, such as walking or taking the subway, each of which has its
own risks.
How does a consumer become well informed? A consumer be-
comes well informed by gaining information about the product and
then rationally assessing its level of risk.' 0 To accomplish this the
consumer would most likely read the label on the product, or a bro-
chure of its safety features, or maybe even a Consumer Digest arti-
cle. But what if the consumer is at a low level of literacy? The
numbers are staggering: 21% to 23% of adults-or some 40 to 44
million of the 191 million in this country-demonstrate skills in
the lowest level of prose, document and quantitative proficiencies
(Level 1). 11 Individuals included in Level 1 are diverse, but display
limited skills; some are unable to total an entry on a deposit slip,
locate the time and place of a meeting on a form or identify a piece
of specific information in a brief news article. 12
But literacy problems are only one of the more obvious barri-
ers to consumers making truly informed decisions. We will argue
that the assumptions upon which the law and economics theory
are based are simply not accurate, and a court's reliance on the
theory is not possible because it lacks validity. Specifically, we will
argue that consumers do NOT make rational decisions because
they are not well-informed about the potential risks they face, and
because they are biased in the way they process the information
they do possess. Although both of these issues are critical for un-
derstanding how consumers make decisions about risk, our discus-
sion will focus primarily upon the first issue because others are
better able to address the second issue.
Stated simply, we believe that the flow of information in orga-
nizations, about the potential riskiness of products is very limited.
As a result, consumers do not have the information they need to
make a truly rational decision. Although one might argue that or-
ganizations are purposefully working to keep any such information
10. See id.
11. See Irwin S. Kirsch et al., Adult Literacy in America: A First Look at the
Results of the National Adult Literacy Survey, National Center for Education Sta-
tistics (Sept. 1993). Surveys were conducted during 1992 with 13,600 individuals
age 16 and older, selected randomly, plus additional surveys for selected groups.
Total sample size was over 26,000. Results were reported in terms of levels [Level
1 is lowest; Level 5 is highest] for three literacy scales: prose, document and
quantitative.
12. See id.
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from the consumer, and so are acting rationally, we believe that
the processes in operation are much more complex than that. In
our discussion, we will draw upon several bodies of research from
organizational behavior and management, to argue that, whether
or not organizations intend to hide potential risks from consumers,
there are several processes operating in most organizations that
will work to severely limit the information available. Unfortu-
nately, these processes will also result in the organization itself
making less than rational decisions because the decision-makers in
the organization will also fail to have all the information they
need.
Specifically, we will argue that group decision processes, such
as groupthink, will make it less likely that even the decision-mak-
ers themselves are fully informed about potential risks. Next, we
will suggest that even when decision-makers do learn about
problems, their reactions will not always be as one might expect
because of a phenomenon known as escalation of commitment. We
will then discuss the role of individuals who can potentially make
these risks public, but are often restrained in their attempts to do
so (whistleblowers). Finally, we will discuss how organizations use
"accounts" to put a positive spin on any problems that have been
identified and have been made public. Thus, in the end, we will
argue that corporations control the information flow within the or-
ganization and to the consumer, causing the employees and the
consumer to be uninformed. As a result, there can be no rational
consumer, and so the law and economics approach to dealing with
product liability cases is of questionable value.
We will begin our discussion with a brief consideration of bi-
ases and problems that relate to individual decision-making. As
noted above, this is not the primary focus of our discussion, but we
recognize that, even if consumers had all the relevant information
available to them, there is good reason to believe that they would
not make economically rational decisions. We leave it to others,
however, elsewhere in this volume, to discuss these issues in more
detail. But, we believe that it is important to open our discussion
with the recognition of those factors that limit the applicability of
economic assumptions regarding individual decisions.
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INDWIDUAL CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING
Human beings are NOT passive processors of information.
Any individual who makes decisions brings his or her own beliefs,
biases and other idiosyncrasies to each decision. Furthermore, in-
dividuals are limited in their ability to process information, and
tend to use the information that is most easily accessible rather
than seeking out new information. If a decision-maker does not
have, or seek all the relevant information, he or she cannot make a
truly rational decision. It is true that a decision can be rational
within the bounds of the information used, but this is often not the
most rational decision that can be made. There are many reasons
to believe that decision-makers do not use all the information that
they need, and these reasons are also viewed as "threats" to ra-
tional decision-making. Although these issues are not the focus of
the present discussion and, in fact, they are discussed in much
more detail elsewhere, it is helpful to briefly review some of the
biases that limit the rationality of individual decisions.' 3
Framing and Loss Aversion
When individuals are given choices to make, these choices can
be framed either in terms of potential losses or potential gains. But
there is a fair body of research' 4 to suggest that people's aversion
to loss is far greater than their attraction to gain. Therefore, when
people are faced with a choice between a sure gain and a risky gain
(of greater value), they will generally take the sure thing. But,
when people are faced with the choice between a sure loss and a
risky loss (of greater value), they will generally take the risky al-
ternative and hope they will lose nothing.' 5 Thus, most people pre-
fer a guaranteed payment of $100 to 50% chance to either win
$200, or win nothing, but, they prefer the 50% chance of losing
$200 (or lose nothing), to the certainty of losing $100. Since the
expected values in each case are the same, it is irrational to prefer
13. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Deci-
sions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981) (discussing the limita-
tion of rationality in decision-making); Paul Slovic et al., Cognitive Biases and
Societal Risk Taking, ORI Res. Bull. 16 (1974) (studying the impact of biases in
rational decision-making).
14. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 13, at 457-58.
15. See id. at 454-55.
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one outcome to the other in either case. 16 Yet, when the problem is
framed in terms of potential losses, people prefer riskier options,
and when the problem is framed in terms of potential gains, they
prefer more certain options.
Availability Bias
When people are assessing the probabilities of something hap-
pening, they base these judgments on the extent to which they can
call to mind different outcomes. 17 Therefore, if you were trying to
decide whether to start smoking and were worried about cancer,
you would be less likely to start smoking (because you would as-
sess the probability of getting cancer as higher) if a close relative
recently died of cancer. If no such example is easily available to
you, you will underestimate the probability of getting cancer. This
ignores the actual probability of getting cancer, and leads to an
irrational decision based on your personal experience.
Base Rate Problems
Decision-makers have problems in dealing with base-rate in-
formation, especially if they have personal information that con-
tradicts the base-rate information.' Let us say that we know that
95% of all first graders are seven years old. But you meet five chil-
dren in a row who are in the first grade and are eight years old. A
sixth first-grader comes along and you have to guess the child's
age-you are likely to guess that he or she is also eight years old,
even though the odds of the child being seven remain ninety-five in
a hundred.
These last two sources of bias recently received some attention
in the media, relative to the issue of hormone replacement therapy
for women.' 9 The medical evidence seemed to suggest that the
therapy was effective in reducing the chances of heart disease, and
so gained some popularity. 20 But then evidence came to light to
16. See id.
17. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974).
18. See id.
19. See Susan Okie, New Studies Raise Old Fears: Do the Benefits Outweigh
Risk When it Comes to Hormone Replacement Therapy?, Detroit News, Mar. 5,
2000, at A6.
20. See id.
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suggest that the therapy could increase the chances of certain
forms of breast cancer. 21 This latter finding caused women to turn
away from the therapy. But, as noted by several medical experts
at the time, for most women, the chances of dying from heart dis-
ease were much greater than the chances of dying from breast can-
cer.22 Thus, the rational decision (for most women anyway) would
be to undergo the therapy, but it took the medical community a
great deal of time to convince women to make this "rational"
choice.
Again, these cognitive biases deserve much greater attention
because they severely impair one's ability to make rational deci-
sions. Thus, they call into serious question any assumptions of ra-
tionality that might be made. But, one might argue that
individuals differ in their susceptibility to these biases, and that,
by identifying the potential biases, we can make decision-makers
aware of them and so make them easy to avoid. This may or may
not be the case, but it may be a point worth discussing. However,
in order to make any assumptions about any person being rational
in any situation, we must also assume that the person has the nec-
essary information available to him or her and that the decision-
maker simply chooses to ignore the information or to use it incor-
rectly. The remainder of our discussion will raise questions about
this second assumption. We believe that consumers, making
purchase decisions cannot possibly make rational decisions be-
cause the information they need is really not available to them.
We will argue that this is due to a number of processes that take
place in organizations that restrict the information available to the
consumer. We turn, then, to a discussion of ways in which organi-
zations actually work to limit the rationality of consumer
decisions.
How ORGANIZATIONS LIMIT RATIONALITY
Organizations restrict the flow of unfavorable information to
consumers. Thus, consumers cannot possibly make rational deci-
sions because they do not have the information they need to make
those decisions. Of course, these consumers might well be unable
to make rational decisions because of the biases discussed above,
21. See id.
22. See id.
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but the lack of total information makes the chances of rational de-
cisions even slighter.
Why do organizations work to limit the unfavorable informa-
tion available to them? The obvious answer is to avoid lawsuits
and charges of responsibility. In fact, this is an important part of
the process, but it is not the only part. Just as there are biases
limiting individual's ability to make rational decisions, there are
other "biases" that operate at the organizational level.23 Some of
these make it less likely that anyone will learn about problems or
acquire negative information, and these biases often operate with-
out anyone really being aware of them. In fact, there is a tendency
in organizations to ignore or dismiss unfavorable information. 24
This is, in itself, irrational. However, there is a considerable body
of evidence which suggests that this is exactly what happens
through a number of different mechanisms, which are discussed
below.
Groupthink
When groups make decisions, information that is contrary to
the general group sentiment is censored. That is, anyone raising
an objection to a course of action or even questioning that course of
action is usually censored by other members of the group. As a
result, the group really does NOT consider all the information
available to it, and so makes irrational decisions that are often dis-
astrous. This problem is referred to as "groupthink."25
This phenomenon is most prevalent in groups where there is a
high level of cohesiveness (i.e., attraction to remain a part of the
group). This cohesiveness tends to be higher when group members
are more similar to each other and where the group has enjoyed
success in the past.26 It is interesting to note that, although re-
search generally indicates that cohesive groups are mostly (al-
though not always) more productive, the desire to maintain
cohesiveness may override the desire to make a rational decision. 27
That is, to maintain cohesiveness, individuals must suppress their
voice and be a "team player," limiting perceived dilatory dissent.
23. See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 7 (2d ed. 1983).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 245.
27. See id. at 245-48.
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At the same time, cohesive groups tend to be high on seeking con-
currence. Thus, if a group has been successful in the past, they
will soon gain a sense of their own invulnerability. Understanding
one's limitations in an environment or situation is crucial in as-
sessing a decision. However, if a group feels invulnerable they will
overestimate their capabilities and unanimity and enter into an ill-
fated course of action. Group members, who respect each other's
opinions, come to believe that everyone is in agreement, because no
one voices dissension; and when dissension is voiced, the dissenter
is often portrayed as disloyal, or his or her concerns are discounted
by so-called "mind guards."28
A classic example of groupthink in action occurred during the
decisions around the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The comments of some
of those who were present are quite telling. Ted Sorensen stated:
"No strong voice of opposition was raised in any of the key meet-
ings, and no realistic alternatives were presented."2 9 Moreover, Ar-
thur Schlesinger stated "Our meetings took place in a curious
atmosphere of assumed consensus."30 President Kennedy, several
days before the final decision, and still feeling confused by his own
judgment and decision-making skills, stated: "we seem now des-
tined to go ahead on a quasi-minimum basis."31 All under Ken-
nedy felt it would have been difficult for anyone to voice
disagreement and remain a member of the group in good
standing.32
Thus, decisions made by groups of managers in organizations
can easily be irrational, as the group becomes victim to groupthink.
For example, a group of managers at some organization, discussing
the possibility of a potential problem occurring, might not be will-
ing to listen to anyone who says that the exact series of events that
might lead to a disaster (such as an actual explosion) is not that
uncommon. It is difficult to design a system based on rationality,
when the organization in question is, itself, making irrational deci-
sions. But what happens when an organization is faced with the
realization that they have made an error, or have followed the
wrong course of action? A rational decision-making model would
28. See id. at 175.
29. Janis, supra note 23, at 38.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 40.
32. See id. at 39.
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suggest that, once the realization occurs, the organization will
abandon the present course of action and pursue an alternative.33
Clearly this will be more difficult (and less likely) if the organiza-
tion has already traveled down the road quite far, and has commit-
ted large amounts of resources to a given course of action.
Unfortunately, there is a considerable body of data to suggest
that organizations fail to correct mistakes, even when they have
not already committed large amounts of resources to a course of
action.34 In fact, a phenomenon known as "escalation of commit-
ment" suggests that organizations (and individuals) actually com-
mit increasing amounts of resources to failing courses of action.35
Escalation of Commitment
The formal introduction of the concept of escalation of commit-
ment came from Barry Staw when he began describing situations
where decision-makers actually increased their level of commit-
ment to a course of action when they discovered that the course
was failing.36 Staw drew upon another example from our history,
when he described the U.S. decisions to send more troops to Viet-
nam. He suggested that as the U.S. began a troop build-up, it be-
came clear that it would not be able to easily defeat the North
Vietnamese and Vietcong, as had been promised. Rather than ad-
mit that the original plan was perhaps wrong, our government re-
sponded by sending even more troops to the conflict.3 7 In fact, we
repeated this decision several times, even though, at no point, was
there any information to suggest that this course of action was
succeeding. 38
33. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 13, at 453.
34. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Expert Measurement and Mechanical Combina-
tion, 7 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 86 (1972); Gary J. Gaeth
& James Shanteau, Reducing the Influence of Irrelevant Information on Exper-
ienced Decision-Makers, 33 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 263
(1984).
35. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Ante-
cedents, Prototypes, and Solutions, 9 Res. Organizational Behav. 39 (1987).
36. See Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating
Commitment to Chosen Course of Action, 16 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Per-
formance 27, 27 (1976).
37. See id.
38. See id.
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Consider the following memo sent to Lyndon Johnson by Un-
dersecretary of State George Ball as the early decision to send
more troops was being contemplated:
The decision you face now is crucial. Once large numbers of
U.S. troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to
take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight
in a noncooperative if not downright hostile countryside.
Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-
nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great
that we cannot-without national humiliation-stop short of
achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities, I
think humiliation would be more likely than achievement of
our objectives-even after we have paid terrible costs. 3 9
This phenomenon was demonstrated in situations with less
dramatic consequences in a number of studies,40 and it seems to be
quite robust. Notice that we are not suggesting that decision-mak-
ers will simply stick with a failing course of action, but that they
will actually increase their level of commitment (of resources as
well as psychological commitment) to a course of action that is fail-
ing.41 In the present context, we can think about a firm that has
discovered that there is a problem with one of its products. Rather
than using this newfound information to recall the product and ne-
gate future liability, the company hides and denies the problem.
No one is supposed to talk about the problem, but someone does
and it leaks to the public. It should be clear, at this point, that the
company will not be able to keep the problem quiet, and so the
logical response would be to confess all and ask for sympathy. But
the "preferred" response is to work even harder to deny the prob-
lem and/or to keep it quiet. Such a response may not be rational,
but it seems to be likely. Given Bill Clinton's response to leaks
about his affair with Monica Lewinsky, escalation of commitment
is still alive and well.
But, if this response is not rational, why do so many decision-
makers adopt it? Research in escalating commitment has shown
that escalation situations are primarily a function of psychological
traits such as self-justification. 42 However, the effect of such traits
39. Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Ac-
tion, 6 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 577, 577-78 (1981).
40. See id. at 578-81.
41. See Staw & Ross, supra note 35, at 41.
42. See Stew, supra note 39, at 581-83.
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on decision-making is also "dependent upon a number of variables
which include the situation, the level of commitment, and the cul-
tural norms involved."43 When there is a strong need for external
justification, an administrator will likely save a policy failure by
enlarging the commitment of resources. Stiff policy resistance
causes the decision-maker to defend her policy because a link is
created between the policy and the individual making the policy.44
The policy-maker is not only defending the policy but her own
character. The administrator will be motivated to protect herself
against failure.
Staw used a simulated case where subjects tended to allocate
more resources to the declining venture rather than the successful
one.45 The subjects made the decision to give initial resources to
the venture. Once the venture started to fail, the resource allo-
cater based her next decision (to put more resources in the project)
on her past decisions. 46 The argument being that her first decision
was based on her own logic and reasoning, and therefore she be-
comes illogically committed to the venture. This situation tends to
develop an irrational escalation of commitment, causing a distribu-
tion of more resources to the failing venture.47
When "failure is not an option," as in the case of an adminis-
trator whose job is vulnerable, the decision-maker keeps pursuing
the objective until the program is terminated or an improbable
windfall occurs.48 There is a paradox in regards to failure, because
maintaining the same course of action is rewarded, while halting
the failing and/or harmful endeavor causes the loss of the man-
ager's livelihood, and so is punished.49
Studies have shown that an escalation of commitment also oc-
curs with groups. Rutledge's study shows that "decision-making
management groups are more likely to escalate their commitment
to a failing course of action when they are responsible for the origi-
43. Scott W. Geiger et al., The Impact of Cultural Values on Escalation of
Commitment, 6 Int'l J. Organizational Analysis 165, 165 (1998).
44. See Staw, supra note 39, at 583.
45. See id. at 579.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 580.
49. See id. at 580-81.
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nal investment decision than when they were not."50 Further-
more, research suggests that context may influence a manager's
decision choices. In 1995, Robert Rutledge investigated whether
responsibility for a prior decision will affect decision-making in in-
teractive groups. 51 The study concluded that groups are subject to
an escalating commitment when they are responsible for a prior
related investment decision and indicated that groups are influ-
enced by the framing of decision-relevant information. 52
Thus, once a manager (or a group of managers) begins down a
course of action, he is not likely to back off from that course of ac-
tion, even when there is information to suggest that it is wrong.
That is to say that the top management of an organization, prepar-
ing a new product for market, is not likely to recall that product, or
even slow its implementation, even when there is information to
suggest that there may be problems with the product. Therefore,
we have two models of behavior (groupthink and escalation of com-
mitment) that suggest that organizations are not likely to behave
in economically rational ways when making decisions. 53 In fact,
the groupthink model suggests that these leaders are not even
likely to be fully aware of the negative information that is actually
available to them. The escalation of commitment model suggest
that, if they do become aware of problems, they are not very likely
to change their course of action.
But, of course, others within the organization, who are not as
committed to a course of action, and are not members of the deci-
sion-making cadre, may also discover the potential problems. They
would be more likely to try to change the course of action by bring-
ing the problems to the attention of others, and so they would have
the potential for getting needed unfavorable information to poten-
tial consumers.54 We usually refer to such individuals as "whistle-
blowers," and there are some interesting points to how organiza-
tions usually deal with them.
50. Robert W. Rutledge, Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Moder-
ating Effects of Information Framing, 17 Mgmt. Res. News 12 (1994).
51. See Robert W. Rutledge, Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Ef-
fects of Information Framing, 11 J. Applied Bus. Res. 17 (1995).
52. See id. at 20-21.
53. See Janis, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
54. See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Effective Whistle-Blowing, 20 Acad.
Mgmt. Rev. 679, 680 (1995).
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Whistle-blowing
A "whistle-blower" is someone who alerts someone else of a
problem within the organization.5 5 This communication may be
internal only, as a concerned employee notifies a supervisor of
some wrongdoing by another employee. In the past, the forces op-
erating in most organizations were clearly designed to discourage
whistle-blowers, and there were many documented cases of retalia-
tion against whistle-blowers.5 6 Today there are two contradictory
trends regarding whistle-blowing. First, judges and legislators ex-
panded protection for the whistle-blower in regards to corporate
retaliation.5 7 This trend's purpose is to motivate those within an
organization to report organizational wrongdoing. However, the
use of secrecy clauses has tremendously increased, preventing the
public from accessing negative information. This has unfortu-
nately caused judges to enforce secrecy agreements against the
whistle-blower.58 Significantly, the enforceability of these clauses
is dependent on the motive for the disclosure, what the information
will protect, the magnitude of the offense and the amount of evi-
dence of the misconduct. The benefits for the employer are two-
fold: first, employers are gaining needed extra protection and,
more importantly, the employer can require an employee to report
wrongdoing internally first.5 9
But organizational reactions to whistle-blowing are not really
as simple as all that. Near and Miceli have proposed a model of
whistle-blowing effectiveness.6° From their perspective, the ulti-
mate goal of whistle-blowing is to cause the organization to termi-
nate the wrongful practice.61 They note that this is more likely if
the person making the allegations has credibility and some power
in the organization. 62 They further argue that effectiveness is a
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Retaliation Against Whistle-
blowers: Predictors and Effects, 71 J. Applied Psych. 137 (1986); Janet P. Near &
Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowers in Organizations: Dissidents or Reformers?, in 8
Res. in Organizational Behav. 321 (Barry M. Staw & Larry L. Cummings eds.,
1987).
57. See Near & Miceli, supra note 53, at 680.
58. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence,
36 Am. Bus. L.J. 151 (1998).
59. See id. at 190.
60. See Near & Miceli, supra note 53, at 688-703.
61. See id. at 686.
62. See id. at 686-88.
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function of the nature of the wrongdoing, and whether or not it is
clearly illegal (which should increase the chance of the wrongdoing
being halted).63 But, they also note that effectiveness is related to
the extent to which the organization is dependent upon the wrong-
doing.64 So, for example, if an organization relies heavily upon
bribes to win contracts, the organization is more likely to fight the
whistle-blower, and less likely to change the practice. Near and
Miceli go on to note that, under these circumstances, although in-
ternal whistle-blowing may be less effective, external whistle-blow-
ing should be more effective, as long as the evidence of the
wrongdoing is compelling.65
The critical point is that whistle-blowing is less likely to be
effective and more likely to result in retaliation, the more the or-
ganization is reliant upon the wrongdoing. Thus, whistle-blowing
is less likely to change behavior and even less likely to occur (for
fear of retaliation) in those cases where we, as consumers, would
most like the whistle-blowing to be effective. In fact, Ettorre notes
that:
[I]n today's supposedly enlightened business world, corporate
America continues to treat its whistleblowers poorly. The no-
tion persists that it is disloyal and irresponsible to criticize
one's employer, notwithstanding the fact that the company
has done wrong .... Other than outright dismissal, retalia-
tion can and does include demotion, false complaints about
job performance, reassignment and relocation, [and] assign-
ment of unsympathetic co-workers or supervisors .... Mis-
treated employees have legal avenues for redress, although
many of these laws are enforced by the same systems in
which the charges originated.66
Furthermore, Near and Miceli note that whistle-blowing is
more likely to be effective in organizations where the culture sup-
ports openness and trust and discourages retaliation against whis-
tle-blowers. 67 They discuss the ethical and moral climate of
organizations as being critical factors in this determination. 68
63. See id. at 698.
64. See id. at 695.
65. See id. at 697.
66. Barbara Ettorre, Whistleblowers: Who's the Real Bad Guy?, 83 Mgmt. Rev.
18, 19-20, 22 (1994).
67. See Near & Miceli, supra note 54, at 699.
68. See id.
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Again, if potential whistle-blowers believe that their actions will
not have the effect of terminating the wrongdoing, and they believe
there is a good chance for retaliation, they will often simply decide
not to raise the issue in the first place. Although this decision, on
the part of the individual employee may be quite rational from an
economic perspective, the fact that the person decides not to call
attention to the problem means that the organization will not have
the information it needs to make a rational decision.
But, finally, the unfavorable information may get out. The
consumer has the information (in a few cases) that she or he needs
to make a rational decision, but the organization's interference is
not yet over. It is possible for the organization to present the unfa-
vorable information in such a way that the consumer will not react
to it as expected. In fact, as we shall see, some organizations have
been able to use "accounts" of wrongdoing as a way to actually in-
crease their legitimacy in the eyes of consumers and society.
Accounts of Wrongdoing and Legitimacy
Finally, we will take our analysis one more step. In some situ-
ations, it is clear that the organization will simply not be able to
suppress the information about problems and/or wrong-do-
ings-someone will find out and leak it to others. It is interesting to
note that there is a body of evidence that suggests the company's
opportunities to manipulate information available to the public are
still not over. Although people may know what happened, the com-
pany can still work to get out a favorable story about why it hap-
pened. Several researchers have examined these processes in
action and have suggested ways in which organizations can manip-
ulate the perceptions of their legitimacy by telling different stories
about how things went wrong or why they went wrong.6 9 Note
that the organization that finds itself at this point in the process is
probably acting rationally when it tries to manage the accounts
that get to the public.
For example, in 1990, Waldenbooks had apparently received
bomb threats because they had continued to sell "The Satanic
69. Kimberly D. Elsbach & Robert I. Sutton, Acquiring Organizational Legiti-
macy Through Illegitimate Actions: A Marriage of Institutional and Impression
Management Theories, 35 Acad. Mgmt. J. 699, 718-23 (1992).
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Verses."70 Soon thereafter, they removed the book from their book-
shelves, and various groups immediately criticized the company for
ignoring basic notions of freedom of speech. In fact, various groups
began picketing Waldenbooks' stores around the country. The sit-
uation seemed simple-Waldenbooks had apparently given in to
pressure by Islamic fundamentalists and had stopped selling the
book-even though these actions would not be consistent with our
basic ideas about free speech. But Waldenbooks fought back, stat-
ing that they hadn't really withdrawn the book. Instead, they were
waiting for further shipments to reach stores, but, in the mean-
while, they were shipping orders from their warehouses. They also
noted how brave their employees were to work under the fear of
bomb threats. In this way, Waldenbooks deflected criticism that
they were bowing to pressure since they stated they were still sell-
ing the book, and they changed the focus to the bravery of their
employees. Thus, they worked to establish their legitimacy in this
crisis and to manage the impressions of the public about their be-
havior.71 In other cases, organizations have used "de-coupling"
where the management distanced themselves from the people who
actually made the decisions that caused the problems. 72 Such a
strategy might work, for example, in an academic institution
where the President could "blame" a problem on the University
Foundation, which is an independent body. In still other cases, or-
ganizations act quickly and decisively to deal with the problem,
thus deflecting criticism about the cause of the problem in the first
place (the Tylenol response), or they can simply note that any
harm was unintentional, and, again, move to rectify the problem. 73
In any case, the company can work to limit the damages that
are associated with the problem by "telling a story" that puts the
company in more favorable light.74 Thus, if all else fails (relative
to controlling information), the company can still distort the way in
which consumers use that information to make decisions by
manipulating the consumers' attribution for blame. Perhaps the
70. See generally id. (providing a detailed account of the Waldenbooks
controversy).
71. See id. at 729-30.
72. See id. at 715-17, 724.
73. See id. at 729.
74. See Kimberly D. Elsbach, Managing Organizational Legitimacy in the Cal-
ifornia Cattle Industry: The Construction and Effectiveness of Verbal Accounts, 39
Admin. Sci. Q. 57, 58-60 (1994).
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most amazing use of these tactics can be found at Disney. Over the
years, a number of people have been injured on rides at Disney
theme parks.7 5 Several of these individuals have attempted to sue
Disney, but no one has done so successfully. 76 The Disney defense
includes references to Mickey Mouse and good, clean family fun, as
well as information about the care and maintenance they give to
their rides. 77 The combination seems irresistible to jurors who
have problems finding the people who brought us Mickey and Don-
ald, guilty of negligence. 78
CONCLUSION
Human fallibility would seem to be a prodigious adversary to
the law and economics model. Consumers often make irrational
decisions because of the operation of various cognitive biases. But,
even if these biases were not in operation, consumers would have a
difficult time making rational decisions because the organizations
involved limit the (unfavorable) information available to the con-
sumer, either consciously or unconsciously. How do consumers ef-
fectively evaluate "risk" when they lack the needed information?
We would argue that they could not in most cases. Consumers
rarely, if ever, have all the information to evaluate the true bene-
fits, so that they may compare that to the price of the product? To
make the consumer accountable for faulty products, as the law and
economics theory states, would logically require that the organiza-
tion acted "rationally" and allowed all relevant information to get
to the public.
But we have discussed a number of reasons why this is not the
case. Internal decision-making processes (such as groupthink)
may insure that the management of the company itself does not
know about potential problems. When managers learn about any
such problems, they are more likely to ignore them, and continue
on the same course of action to which they were already commit-
ted. If any employee does call a problem to the attention of the
management, and the message is received, the employee might de-
cide to become a whistle-blower, despite the heavy price he or she
75. See generally David Koenig, Mouse Tales: A Behind-The-Ears Look at Dis-
neyland (1994) (recounting Disney's management of negligence claims against it).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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may have to pay for that decision. Finally, even when unfavorable
information does manage to get to consumers, companies work to
"spin" the story in such a way that they can escape much of the
blame. Therefore, we cannot rely on rational decisions and effi-
cient markets to guard the rights of consumers. We need instead a
strong system of tort laws that allow individuals to sue negligent
organizations and to be compensated for damages. Consumers
also deserve to receive payment for punitive damages in cases
where organizations are aware of problems and actively seek to
keep this information from consumers.
In closing, we have two more brief observations. One is that
research has actually identified some characteristics of organiza-
tions that are actually involved in illegal actions. Although we be-
lieve this information is interesting, we must point out that the
studies involved are based only on organizations that have been
caught breaking the law. Therefore, the information we are about
to present may actually tell us more about unsuccessful criminal
actions, than about criminal actions in general.
In any case, according to a study by Baucus and Near,79 illegal
actions are most likely to be committed by companies that are:
• large (such acts are presumably easier to hide inside such
companies)80
* operating in dynamic environments (lots of changes and
challenges may make such actions more attractive as a
means of gaining advantage)8'
* operating in munificent environments (high growth rates
usually result in people willing to take greater risks so as to
make greater gains)8 2
* operating companies in the food, lumber, petroleum refining
and automobile industries8 3
In this study, illegal acts mean violations of the law in the follow-
ing areas: product liability, anti-trust, environmental and discrimi-
nation. Interestingly, the automobile industry was the clear
79. See Melissa S. Baucus & Janet P. Near, Can Illegal Corporate Behavior Be
Predicted? An Event History Analysis, 34 Acad. Mgmt. J. 9 (1991).
80. See id. at 14-15.
81. See id. at 13.
82. See id. at 12.
83. See id. at 17.
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winner in terms of the most product liability cases, from 1974 to
1983.84
In addition, a study by Daboub, Rasheed, Priem and Gray sug-
gested that these relationships could be moderated by the top man-
agement team (TMT) makeup.8 5 Specifically, they argue that the
relationship between these factors and illegal activities will be
weaker when:
" the TMT is older and has more tenure in its role86
* TMT members are better educated8 7
" the TMT is less homogeneous (i.e., more diversity in terms
of race, age, gender and background-presumably this would
reduce the effects of groupthink)88
Finally, when we first read about the ideas of the law and eco-
nomics movement, we were a bit surprised that anyone would ac-
tually suggest that companies sell products for a lower price,
knowing that they are risky, and that consumers would be ac-
cepting that risk by paying the lower price. We really didn't think
about these issues in those terms. But, learning something new
makes you more aware of other instances with similar circum-
stances. Therefore, we will end with a recent article found in a pop-
ular travel magazine.8 9
The article described the Smart, a tiny car (a two-seater, that
is only 8.2 feet long) manufactured by a division of Daimler-
Chrysler, conceived of by the founder of Swatch, and sold exclu-
sively in Europe.90 DaimlerChrysler projected sales of 130,000
units in its first year, but those projections fell sharply (to 30,000)
as tests indicated that the "Swatchmobile" (as it is unofficially
known) had a tendency to tip over during lane changes. 91 In addi-
tion, drivers began to complain about losing control on icy roads.92
Rumors suggested that, after these problems, DaimlerChrysler
84. See id.
85. See Anthony Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and
Corporate Illegal Activity, 20 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 138, 139 (1995).
86. See id. at 152-53.
87. See id. at 155.
88. See id. at 157-58.
89. See Erik Torkells, Get SMART: The Smart Car in Paris, Travel and Lei-
sure, Nov. 1999, at 156-57.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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would stop making and selling the car, but it turned out that these
rumors were false.93 Rather than discontinuing the potentially
dangerous car, the company will continue selling Smarts (hope-
fully improved), but, apparently in recognition of the inherent risk
to the consumer, they will simply sell the cars for a lower price!94
93. See id.
94. See id.
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